Federal Reserve: William McChesney Martin Jr. : a reevaluation by John H. Wood
I
t is high time that William
McChesney Martin, Jr., is
reevaluated. He was subjected
to virtually unanimous adverse criti-
cism from the economics profession
during his tenure as the longest-serv-
ing Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, from March 1951 to February
1970 (three months longer than Alan
Greenspan). For instance, all 23 pro-
fessors who appeared before
Congress’ hearings on “The Federal
Reserve System after Fifty Years”
supported Chairman Wright
Patman’s attack on the Fed’s inde-
pendence and the use made of it.
Four, including Milton Friedman,
favored money rules, and the rest
joined Paul Samuelson in recom-
mending the “coordination of
monetary, fiscal, and debt policies”
under the direction of the Executive.
This was before later monetary
policies and inflations caused us to
look back longingly at the record
under Martin. Christina and David
Romer have summarized monetary
policy over “the past 50 years” as an
“evolution from a crude but funda-
mentally sensible model of how the
economy worked in the 1950s, to
more formal but faulty models in the
1960s and 1970s, and finally to a
model that was both sensible and
sophisticated in the 1980s and
1990s.” Average annual inflation in
Martin’s first decade was 2.2 percent
compared with 7.1 percent and 2.5
percent in the 1970s and 1990s. The
first period was also the least
volatile, with a 0.87 percent standard
deviation of inflation compared with
1.60 percent and 0.93 percent in the
later periods.
Robert Bremner’s recent biogra-
phy,  Chairman of the Fed: William
McChesney Martin, Jr., and the Creation
of the Modern American Financial
System, fills a gap in the history of
central banking, and of the financial
markets generally. This is not only
because of Martin’s importance to
monetary policy through two event-
ful decades, but also because, as the
first full-time president (at age 31) of
the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), he guided its accommoda-
tions with the New Deal regulators
who wanted to remake the financial
markets. What we see is a tough and
consistent man. His principles were
those of a conserver — of institu-
tions and the value of money. 
Martin’s life is a story of battles
for those principles even when, as
was usual, he was in the minority and
had to use his considerable negotiat-
ing skills. He can be viewed as the
most determined fighter in the his-
tory of the Fed. Without
downplaying the successes of
Benjamin Strong, Paul Volcker, and
Alan Greenspan, they benefited
from government forbearance and
considerable approval from the aca-
demic community. The last half of
Martin’s term, however, was a fight,
with limited help from a divided
Federal Reserve Board, against easy-
money administrations supported by
the majority of economists. He was
known at once for his collegiality in
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(approaching obstinacy, President
Lyndon Johnson thought) in dealing
with threats from the outside, both
of which contrasted with chairmen
Marriner Eccles and Arthur Burns.
Martin was a conserver even in his
efforts in 1951 on the side of the
Fed’s independence. The reestab-
lishment of the independence that
had been taken away in 1933
(although its subordination was
most obvious in the bond support
program — the “peg” — which
began in 1942) places Martin in
the pantheon of genuine central
bankers. By this I mean those who
focused on price stability instead
of thinking of the Fed’s actions 
as part of a coordinated fiscal and
monetary program aimed at multiple
goals. Martin’s overriding objective
at the Fed and NYSE was stability,
cooperatively if possible, digging in
his heels when necessary.
Our knowledge of his conflicts is
mainly from others, with a few from
Martin’s accounts for the Fed’s files.
Evidence of his backbone was shown
during a meeting of the “quadriad”
(President Kennedy, Treasury
Secretary Douglas Dillon, Chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers
Walter Heller, and Martin), when the
“exasperated” President asked
Martin “why he would not agree with
his other advisers” and “Martin
responded that he was the only per-
son in the room that did not work for
the President.” 
Martin’s monetary policy was root-
ed in his background, and his actions
at the Fed are better understood in
light of his behavior at the NYSE in
the 1930s and government service in
the 1940s. The following discussion of
Martin, the man, is taken largely from
Bremner. The economic interpreta-
tions are mine. I hope the reader will
agree that Martin’s economic views
were more sophisticated than he was
given credit for.
Early Career
William McChesney Martin, Jr., was
born in 1906. His father was appointed
Chairman of the Board of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in
1914, and served as president (called
governor before the Banking Act of
1935) from 1929 to 1941. The St. Louis
Fed district was predominantly rural,
and in his teenage years, junior often
heard his father “expressing concern
about excessive borrowing by overly
optimistic farmers.” Farm values rose
dramatically with farm prices during
and after World War I, before they
both collapsed in 1921. One-fifth of
the banks in the district (and the
country) failed in the 1920s.
Martin attended Yale, majored in
English, and took some courses in
economics, where, according to
Bremner, he learned “that his father
and other Federal Reserve bankers
were considered hopelessly out of
date because of their misguided
warnings about excessive speculation
in the stock market.” The foremost
economist at Yale during this period
was Irving Fisher, whose pronounce-
ment a week before the Crash that
stock prices had reached a “perma-
nent high plateau” became famous.
Martin’s behavior three and four
decades later demonstrates that he
took the lesson. My job at the Fed, he
would say, is to “take away the punch
bowl just as the party gets going.”
After a brief stint as a bank exam-
iner for the St. Louis Fed, Martin
went to work for A.G. Edwards &
Sons in November 1928, as a “board
boy” who updated stock prices on a
large chalkboard. His uncle, Albert
Edwards, was managing director of
one of the few significant securities
firms away from the East Coast, which
continues today with headquarters
still in St. Louis. Martin soon became
the sole member of a new research
department. During the next few
years he witnessed the financial ruin
of many of Edwards’ clients. 
In 1931, he moved to New York as
Edwards’ floor broker at the NYSE.
He took courses in economics and
finance at night school at the
New School for Social Research,
and was a leader in the organiza-
tion of the Economic Forum
Quarterly. The journal included
articles by John Maynard Keynes
and Josiah Stamp, and Martin
continued as one of the publish-
ers until they sold it in 1934.
Martin began to study for a
Ph.D. in finance at Columbia but
his attention turned to the gover-
nance of the Exchange. In May 1935,
he was elected a governor. The
Exchange had been under attack
since the Crash and the new
Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) pressed for
reforms. Change was resisted by
many, including Richard Whitney,
head of the Exchange, but a few
sought accommodation. Martin was
new and unsullied and found that
“the out-of-town firms were glad to
support me” as a member of the
reform movement.
He would rise quickly to the top
of the NYSE, where he would serve
as president for three years. Much of
his presidency was devoted to pre-
serving the Exchange’s position in
the financial industry and the profits
of its members. He was generous
with promises of audits and stricter
supervision, but there was no signifi-
cant change in membership or
trading practices, particularly in the
dealer functions of the vilified spe-
cialists. Bremner writes of the
failures of Martin’s reform efforts
but one could view his record more
charitably, as resisting the call to
make widespread, and perhaps hasty,
changes. 
Martin resigned his position at
the Exchange in 1941, and entered
the Army as a private. He rose to
colonel as he spent the war working
on Russian lend-lease, becoming
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Missouri Democrat did not damage
his postwar prospects, and in
November 1945, John Snyder, St.
Louis banker and adviser to
President Truman, asked Martin to
become president of the Export-
Import Bank. Bremner describes
Martin’s term at Ex-Im as a succes-
sion of run-ins with the State and
Treasury departments as he defend-
ed the institution’s independence of
politics. 
On Jan. 1, 1949, Martin became
assistant secretary of the Treasury for
International Affairs under Snyder,
who had become secretary in 1946.
He was involved in the negotiation of
currency realignments following the
British devaluation in September
1949, and for the occupied former
enemies. He became Snyder’s confi-
dant on a wide range of policy
matters, and was drawn into the
Treasury’s dispute with the Federal
Reserve.
The Fed was fighting for its inde-
pendence from the Treasury — not
for the first time. To put the dispute
in historical perspective, the Federal
Reserve Act of 1913 created a System
of 12 district banks with general
oversight by a Board in Washington
whose members were appointed by
the President of the United States
(five members with rotating 10-year
terms, changed to seven members for
14-year terms in 1935). The Federal
Reserve banks were owned by their
member banks, and their heads were
chosen by their boards of directors.
So the Fed was given considerable
freedom from the Executive — if it
chose to exercise it, which is not pos-
sible in wartime because it is
duty-bound to support the war
effort. That means the monetization
of government deficits. The Treasury
kept up its pressure on the Fed to
prevent interest rates from rising
after the end of World War I, a poli-
cy that caused the consumer price
index to rise 31 percent between
October 1918 and June 1920. 
The Fed was relatively free from
early 1920 until Franklin Roosevelt
became President in March 1933.
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz
have referred to the prosperous and
stable-price 1920s as “the high tide of
the Federal Reserve System.” The
massive falls in money, prices, and
employment during the Great
Depression of 1929 to 1933 produced a
reaction in which the Roosevelt
administration assumed control of
monetary policy. 
The only significant changes in the
Fed’s structure were made by the
Banking Act of 1935, under the influ-
ence of Mariner Eccles, a Utah
businessman who was attracted to
Washington by the New Deal, and
became Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board in 1934. The most
important change affecting policy in
the long run was the formalization of
the open market committee that had
been a voluntary vehicle for coordina-
tion between Reserve banks. The new
Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) consisted of the seven gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve Board, the
president of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, and four more Bank
presidents on a rotating basis. The
Chairman of the Board also chaired
the FOMC.
Structural changes were irrelevant
while monetary policy was directed by
the Treasury, which decided on a low-
interest war, in particular, a Treasury
bill rate pegged at 0.375 percent, and
an average yield on U.S. long-term
bonds of about 2.4 percent. The
administration’s pressure to maintain
low rates persisted even longer than
after World War I. The peg continued
unchanged until July 1947, and bills
had risen to only 1.14 percent at the
cyclical peak in November 1948,
despite average annual inflation of 10
percent from 1946 to 1948. The long
bond yield was virtually unchanged at
2.44 percent. 
Throughout this period the
Federal Reserve tried to negotiate the
freedom to fight inflation. It had
occasional support from Congress but
the administration would not aban-
don its low-interest policy. The Fed’s
resistance increased with the infla-
tionary pressures of the Korean War
that began in June 1950, 
and it broke into open rebellion 
as President Truman’s political 
position weakened. Martin represent-
ed the administration in negotiating
the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord
that was announced on March 4, 1951:
The Treasury and the Federal
Reserve System have reached full
accord with respect to debt-man-
agement and monetary policies to
be pursued in furthering their
common purpose to assure the
successful financing of the
Government’s requirements and,
at the same time, to minimize
monetization of the public debt. 
Part of the agreement was Martin’s
appointment as Fed Chairman.
Chairman of the Fed 
Although coming to the Fed from
the Treasury, Martin, like Paul
Volcker later, insisted on the inde-
pendence of monetary policy.
Martin’s long tenure was filled with
conflict but his positions in all of
them redound to his credit when
viewed from later perspectives of
monetary theory and policy. The
distinguishing features of his career
are seen in four conflicts that
extended over the five presidential
administrations during which he
served.
(1) Bills Only. The development 
of open market operations as the
main instrument of monetary poli-
cy meant that the Fed had to be
concerned with the performance of
the government securities market.
Standards had been set for securi-
ties dealers during World War II but
the stability and liquidity of the
market were unthreatened under
the peg. One of Martin’s first
actions at the Fed was to chair an
Ad Hoc Subcommittee “to study
and report on the operations and
functioning of the Open Market
Committee in relation to the
Government securities market”
under the new free-market regime
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mittee’s objective was effective
open market operations, which
requires “an efficiently functioning
Government securities market
characterized by depth, breadth,
and resiliency.”
This was remarkably simi-
lar to the goals of the New
York Stock Exchange, which
regularly publishes “indicators
of market performance” con-
sisting of price continuity,
market depth, and quotation
spreads. Martin’s quiet
obstruction of the SEC attack
on the integrity of stock trad-
ing was carried over to the
promotion of similar performance in
government securities. His purpose
was to achieve flexibility in the
determination of bank reserves with-
out interfering with the efficient
transfers of saving to investment.
Therefore: 
When intervention by the Federal
Open Market Committee is 
necessary to carry out the
System’s monetary policies, 
the market is least likely to 
be seriously disturbed if the 
intervention takes the form of
purchases or sales of very short-
term Government securities.
Although the subcommittee’s
report correctly pointed out that
“bills only,” as the policy came to be
called, was in “the best central bank-
ing traditions,” it was received with
hostility by economists for whom
monetary policy meant the readiness
to force sudden and substantial
changes in interest rates, especially
long-term rates. 
Outside the interventionist aca-
demic atmosphere of the 1950s and
1960s, though, Martin is more easily
defended. The prevailing IS-LM 
policy framework was a comparative-
statics equilibrium model for given
expectations. We have learned that
short-term fiscal policies (such as the
1967  tax surcharge) which are known
to be short term are ineffective.
Ephemeral interest-rate policies may
be even less effective. Whether the
aim is reflation or disinflation, effec-
tive monetary policy requires the
market’s confidence in its serious-
ness. Martin’s agreement is seen
below.
(2) Operation Twist. The “bills only”
policy was terminated in 1961 under
pressure from President Kennedy’s
New Frontier program, which
demanded no restrictions on policy
instruments. The last nine years of
Martin’s term were a continuous bat-
tle with inflationary administrations.
Kennedy’s advisers were inclined
toward fiscal policy but came up with
a challenging program for the Fed
that aimed at the triple objectives of
growth, balance of payments surplus,
and price stability by twisting the
yield curve. The Fed would stimulate
long-term investment by buying
long-term securities. At the same
time, it would help the balance of
payments by attracting short-
term investments through the
higher short-term yields that
would result from sales of
short-term securities. The pro-
gram would not be inflationary
because the added reserves
from purchases of long-terms
would be offset by the sales of
short-terms. 
The candidate had promised: “I
have no doubt that any new
Democratic President will find the
Federal Reserve pursuing a some-
what different policy,” and hinted
that Martin might be replaced. After
the election, when the chairman-des-
ignate of the President’s Council of
Economic Advisers Walter Heller
called on Martin, the latter warned:
“I’m not going to give up the 
independence of the Fed.” But he
added: “There’s plenty of room for
cooperation.”
The administration persuaded
Martin (despite dissents at the Fed)
to nudge short-term rates upward
while keeping long-term rates low.
Operation Nudge turned into
Operation Twist, which would
involve vigorous actions to reduce
long rates. “This is a historic reversal
of policy,” Heller wrote the
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John F. Kennedy 
(1961-1963)
Lyndon B. Johnson 
(1963-1969)
Richard M. Nixon 
(1969-1970)
Harry S. Truman 
(1951-1953)
Dwight D. Eisenhower 
(1953-1961)
Martin served under these five presidents
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Martin’s term were a 
continuous battle with 
inflationary administrations.
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Martin deserves our appreciation.” 
Heller’s satisfaction was prema-
ture. Several members of the FOMC
“were strongly opposed to the end of
‘bills only’ [as] a step back toward
political interference in monetary
policy and a pegged bond market,”
wrote political scientist Donald
Kettl, and Martin managed to obtain
and keep the majority’s support for
Operation Twist only by an execu-
tion that bordered on the
imperceptible. The administration
was disappointed with Martin’s
“team spirit.”  The trouble, Heller
recalled, was that:
…we’d have a meeting with
Kennedy … and before the meet-
ing Bill would be out there buying
those long-term securities, but
afterwards his buying would
flag.... [CEA member] Jim Tobin
would keep track of this and he’d
say, “Walter, you’d better …
arrange another meeting …
because Martin isn’t buying
enough long-term bonds.”  So I’d
call a meeting and sure enough
the purchases would rise again,
and Martin would be able to tell
Kennedy, “We’re doing everything
we can.”
Kennedy’s advisers initially
opposed the Fed Chairman’s reap-
pointment in 1963, but backed away
from that position when they discov-
ered the level of support for Martin
in the business community, both at
home and abroad.
(3) The Vietnam War and the “Credit
Crunch” of 1966. The Federal Reserve
was expected to finance government
spending, and presidents had demon-
strated that they would make a
political issue of price and interest
increases. Martin wanted to address
inflation by monetary restraint, but in
addition to political threats, he had to
deal with increasing opposition with-
in the Federal Reserve as the “New
Economists” came to the Board.
Martin tried to steer a course
between the Keynesians and the
inflation hawks in such a way as to
combat inflation without endanger-
ing the integrity of the Federal
Reserve System. His difficulties
were increased by the absence of 
any real discussion, or even under-
standing, with the Johnson
administration. When Martin pub-
licly warned that inflation might call
for monetary restraint, Johnson’s
Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers Gardner Ackley
told the President: “I don’t think
we’ll ever have a Chairman of the
Federal Reserve who is so completely
out of the mainstream of economics.”
Ackley’s own 1959 paper on inflation
had ignored money and “argued that
the inflationary process is essentially
an administrative one. It arises from
a largely autonomous upward 
pressure on wage rates relative to 
the cost of living, interacting 
with administered-price markups
applied to rising wage costs … in
endless chain.”
The Board consisted of Martin,
three Kennedy-Johnson appointees
(George Mitchell and Dewey Daane,
business economists from Federal
Reserve banks, and academic econo-
mist Sherman Maisel), government
lawyer James Robertson, appointed
by Truman, and Canby Balderston
and Charles Shepardson, college
deans appointed by Eisenhower. The
Vice Chairman of the FOMC was
New York Fed President Alfred
Hayes. Hayes, Balderston, and
Shepardson were anti-inflationists
who were usually joined by two of the
rotating Bank presidents, while
Robertson, Mitchell, Maisel, and two
other presidents generally favored an 
easy-money approach aimed at 
keeping employment robust.
This five-to-five split left the
deciding votes to Martin and Daane,
who also leaned toward a policy of
price stability. So, Maisel later wrote,
decisions “generally favored the
more restrictive targets. However,
because a strong minority stressed
broader objectives, as did the admin-
istration, moves to restrict credit
were less frequent and more moder-
ate; those in the middle had to be
sure of themselves before they joined
the restrictivists.”  
It was in this atmosphere that
Martin urged the administration to
ask Congress for a tax increase.
When promises to do so were not
kept, Martin obtained a commit-
ment to act from a narrow majority
of the Board. With his penchant 
for personalizing disagreements,
Johnson announced to Martin: “I’m
scheduled to go into the hospital
tomorrow for a gall bladder opera-
tion. You wouldn’t raise the discount
rate while I’m in the hospital, would
you?”  Martin paused, and in a reply
that became legendary at the Fed,
said: “No, Mr. President, we’ll wait
until you get out of the hospital.”
Treasury Secretary Henry
Fowler’s recommendation that
Martin be replaced by Volcker (at the
time, deputy undersecretary of the
Treasury for monetary affairs) was
not pursued, and on Dec. 6, 1965, the
discount rate was raised. Johnson
was enraged but the Fed kept up the
pressure. Free reserves at member
banks turned negative, and the
Treasury bill rate rose from 4 percent
to 5.5 percent. But inflation was not
touched. In fact, the CPI rose 3.8
percent (at an annual rate) during the
first six months of 1966 compared
with 1.9 percent in 1965. Federal
spending and the deficit continued
to rise. However, the policy of
restraint was ended by a “credit
crunch” at the end of August. 
Rising deposit rates threatened
the solvency of institutions making
long-term loans. In addition, banks
and S&Ls lost time deposits because
market rates rose above the legal
maxima on deposit rates. The Fed
gave way and resumed purchases.
Martin resolved that next time they
would stay the course.
(4) Richard Nixon. Though he cam-
paigned on a largely conservative
platform, President Nixon recoiled
from the political costs of ending the
inflation that he inherited. He did
not trust Martin, whom he blamed
for the recession that had cost him
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Arthur Burns at the Fed. However,
Martin told the President that he
would not step down before the end
of his term on Jan. 31, 1970. In 1963,
Martin had to be persuaded by
Kennedy to accept reappointment
and three times he offered his resig-
nation to Johnson. Why the
difference? Nixon did not seem likely
to pursue more inflationary policies
than his Democratic predecessors.
That may be the answer. Kennedy
and Johnson felt they needed Martin
as a symbol of sound money and
Martin knew it, whereas in addition
to his personal animosity the
Republican President did not feel
the same need for a sound-money
stamp.
Nixon’s Council Chairman Paul
McCracken hoped that inflation
could be slowed without unemploy-
ment by a policy of “gradualism,”
when what was needed was just the
opposite: to convince the markets
that something significant was going
to happen. Martin and the majority
of his colleagues had stronger medi-
cine than the Council’s in mind.
Worried about the administration’s
commitment and market expecta-
tions, they had raised the discount
rate in December 1968, before Nixon
took office. In February 1969,
Martin apologized to the Joint
Economic Committee for past errors
and said they would not be repeated:
It appears that the Federal
Reserve was overly optimistic in
anticipating immediate benefits
from fiscal restraint … but now we
mean business in stopping infla-
tion. ... A credibility gap exists in
the business and financial com-
munity as to whether the Federal
Reserve will push restraint hard
enough to check inflation. The
Board means to do so and is unan-
imous on that point.
He addressed the apparent lack of
resolve on the part of the govern-
ment, which “has raised the ghost of
overkill at the first sign of a cloud on
the horizon.” The New York Times
reported: “Martin strongly implied
that this will not happen again and
that restraint will persist even when
there are clear signs the economy is
slowing and in the face of some
increase in unemployment.”
The rate of money growth fell and
unemployment rose, but inflation
remained above 6 percent and the
Fed raised the discount rate to 6 per-
cent in April. The Fed kept its nerve
until February 1970, when in Burns’
first meeting, monetary policy
changed direction. The rest, as they
say, is history.
Conclusion
Martin voiced the same sense of fail-
ure in 1970 as in 1941. He had left the
Fed at a time when inflation was on
the rise, as he had left the NYSE
without instituting major reforms. In
his defense, however, he fought infla-
tion as hard and as successfully as
anyone could have done, and he pre-
served the Fed as he preserved the
NYSE. Bremner may be right when
he says that Martin’s greatest contri-
bution was the strengthening of the
Fed as an independent monetary
authority, although that independ-
ence still must be seized.
Skeptical of staff analyses and
forecasts, he never saw any redeem-
ing qualities in inflation. His
statements did not meet the explicit
standards of modern monetary theo-
ry, but the positions to which they
referred were consistent with what is
now thought to be the best in theory
and policy. This includes his anticipa-
tions of later moves toward the
transparency of the Fed’s intentions
and the willingness to take preemp-
tive actions. RF
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